

State-of-Play in China



The aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis revealed the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy

Export-led economic growth model unsustainable

- Exports accounted for 41% of China GDP in 2007, 33% in 2008
- Economic slowdown in key markets like US and Europe left China vulnerable

Strong domestic market essential for equitable growth

- Weak and unsophisticated consumer markets especially in financial services, entertainment, hospitality
- Underdeveloped services sector IT, ITES, airlines

Imminent danger of "middle-income trap"

- GDP per capita grew from \$2000 in 1980 to \$10,000 in 2014
- Steady 6-7% growth required for 2 decades to raise it to \$25,000 (comparable to Korea, Japan)

High social and environment cost of growth

- High levels of pollution across major urban centres
- Labour unrest in many manufacturing hubs
- Wide ranging levels of prosperity between coastal areas and interior regions



To deal with the slowdown and manage domestic expectations in the near term, China deployed an investment-led stimulus package in 2009 and 2010

Stimulus package


- RMB 4 trillion for 2009 and 2010 combined
- Included new spending worth RMB 2 trillion
- Bulk of spending on Infrastructure (72%)


Additional credit expansion through banks

- RRR lowered from 17.5% to 13.5%-15.5%
- Lending interest rate dropped from 7.47% to 5.31%
- Deposit rate reduced from 4.14% to 2.25%

Desired results achieved temporarily


- GDP growth rebounded in 2010 (2009 9.6%, 2010 - 10.6%)
- Stock market rose from 1800 levels to cross 3000 during 2009
- Increasing employment







However, when the stimulus ended, growth slowed and the stock markets reacted





Early successes were reversed...

- GDP growth dipped post 2010
- Stock market started declining


... and other problems on account of the stimulus package surfaced

- Looming bank defaults crisis; loans worth RMB 2 trillion out of RMB 7.3 trillion at risk
- Elevated housing costs due to easy credit-driven demand
- Relaxation of energy-intensive export curbs led to higher energy cost per unit of GDP

Source: IMF, SSE



Exports from China continued to see a strong rebound since 2010 and touched \$2.3 Tn in 2014; trade surplus has crossed the 2008 levels





China acknowledged the need for fundamental measures by unveiling an economic reform agenda at its Third Plenum in Nov 2013 covering 4 areas

Financial sector reforms

- liberalizing interest rates
- establishing deposit insurance
- strengthening financial regulation

Fiscal reforms

- strengthening social safety nets
- efficient and redistributive taxes
- improving health insurance and pension coverage

Structural reforms

- reforming SOEs
- revising the Hukou system
- further opening up markets

External sector reforms

- liberalizing the exchange rate
- capital account controls



Since the reforms were designed to correct structural flaws, they were expected to slowdown economic growth in the short term but deliver long term benefits

Altered cost structures due to higher cost of capital

- Export competitiveness predicated on lower cost of capacity creation in China
- Operating cost structure also benefits from low interest regime
- Interest rate liberalisation would raise the cost of capital
- Impact on exports (mainstay of Chinese economy) would be felt on entire economy

Wide ranging impact of SOE reform

- SOEs enjoy undue advantage in many industry sectors
- Level playing field could lead to closures, consolidation and correction
- Power sector SOE reform will raise power costs impacting overall manufacturing competitiveness

Exchange rate correction

- Imports would become more expensive
- Could effect a slowdown in consumer spending
- IMF in early 2014 estimated slower growth in following years 7.34% (2014), 7.13% (2015), 6.86% (2016), 6.59% (2017)




However, two recent events have brought focus back sharply on the state of China's economy






China devalued the RMB by 4% between July and August 2015



It is widely believed that this is only an attempt to shore up export performance which has been hit in the past 2 quarters








However, the devaluation of the RMB appears to be a part of the economic reform process and a planned strategy towards making it a global currency

- View of China's action as knee-jerk response to exports dip is onedimensional
 - Easing control over RMB peg is part of economic reforms
 - PBoC has been pegging rate of RMB to USD
 - A 2% band was allowed for fluctuations; this is up from 1% earlier
 - Going forward the band will be expanded to 3%
 - China is moving to make the RMB a global currency
 - China lobbying with IMF to get RMB included in Special Drawing Rights
 - SDR is basket of currencies including USD, EUR, GBP, YEN
 - IMF preconditions for SDR inclusion is to make RMB freely floating
 - Devaluation result of this endeavour
 - RMB rose steeply against USD after Nov 2014 (peak of 2.4%; settling at 1.5%)
 - In July, PBoC changed method of pegging RMB resulting in devaluation of ~4%
- Further devaluation may be expected to the tune of ~10% depending on the relative movement of USD and the decision on interest rates later in the year



The other event - SSE Composite Index crashed by almost 60% between June and September 2015 including an 8% drop on Black Monday






Crash linked to sluggish economic performance, but China slowly moving away from command economy model and is serious about economic reforms

No fundamentals supporting stock boom


- economic growth during this period was sluggish
- boom driven by RMB 4 trillion of margin money channeled through CSFC (more stock traders than Communist Party members!!)
- clearly unsustainable conditions
- Govt. attempted to manage the crash...
 - Banned large scale trading in listed companies
 - Devalued RMB to shore up economic growth
- ...but allowed correction in long term interest - CSFC withdraws from daily intervention
- However, even post-crash, market still 30% higher than a year back







Hence, a further slowing of the economy is expected as per recent IMF estimates





However, China committed to reform agenda; long term prospects remain positive; a more calibrated approach likely given the recent backlash

Reforms agenda to continue

- Interest rate liberalisation to be completed by end of 2015
- Deposit interest scheme to be announced next month
- Total financial regulation will take more time but expected to be completed by 2020

More pain in the near term due to economic slowdown

- China accounted for ~30% of global growth in 2014
- Slowdown will hit commodity prices as demand drops

However, China will need to balance domestic concerns


- Further devaluation of RMB to spur exports and protect domestic industry
- Financial reforms will directly impact consumers positively

In the long term, many reasons for optimism in the Chinese economy

- Capital and labour allocation efficiency can be improved significantly
- China can catch up with the West on technology through further liberalisation
- Interiors need to catch up with the coastal areas providing room for growth



We also need to re-visit our interpretation of conventional lead indicators of Chinese economy – like Manufacturing PMI. Given the shift towards services, this may not be reflecting the true prospects of the economy




Manufacturing PMI continues to show contraction while Services PMI is growing. Similarly, low growth of electricity consumption does not truly reflect the situation as a services oriented economy will be less electricity intensive




Implications for India




The INR has devalued more than the RMB vis-à-vis the USD and hence India's competitiveness remains unaffected







However, the trade deficit with China will continue to endure and grow





China will continue to invest strategically in India – this has accelerated in new economy businesses but manufacturing investments are also evident



Tencent 腾讯

Practo raised \$90 Mn in

latest round of funding led

by Tencent

:practo













Hence, India will continue to remain important in China's strategy for the future – both as a market and an investment destination

India will become a substantially important market / investment destination for China...

- China is diversifying its exports markets and investment destinations
- China is intent on becoming more global and open in its economic outlook (including taking Chinese brands global)

- Likely slowing growth rate of China in future
- China's competitiveness gap with India is narrowing
- This will make India an attractive destination of Chinese investment in certain select sectors

 Growing strategic and geopolitical importance of India-China ties - hence the need for China to proactively engage with India



The strategic initiatives to be made by Indian companies and economic bodies will centre around actively engaging with China from a position of strength



Leverage India's Importance - Market and Investment Destination for China.



Push for Market Access in Key Sectors where India can Add Value to Chinese Economy – Pharma, IT, Tourism, Media and Entertainment, Auto Components



Priortise Chinese FDI in 18 identified industry sectors and a Sovereign Deal to Attract Investment in Indian Infrastructure



Set up an institutional basis (Government cum industry) within the PMO or MOCI to direct and monitor the achievement of Goals



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